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Abstract. Most discussions of democratic theory assume that parties should offer clear
choices to voters but also show themselves sensitive to public concerns. Under certain cir-
cumstances, however, party convergence on these may preclude electoral choice, thus 
creating conflict between two democratic ‘goods’. We examine possible tradeoffs between
choice and responsiveness, and see which actually occur in 16 postwar democracies. Party
policy positions turn out to be more strongly related to party ideology than popular 
concerns, thus privileging differentiation and choice over sensitivity and responsiveness.
Implications for democratic theory and practice are considered.
Through its standing institutional arrangements, above all through elections
and party competition, democracy is supposed to bring government into line
with popular preferences. Doing so is a major element in its claim to be ‘gov-
ernment of the people, by the people and for the people’. Parties are crucial
to this process as they formulate the policy priorities presented to electors that
are then applied in government (Aldrich 1995; Klingemann et al. 1994).
There are two ways that parties can bring publics and governments into
line, both prefigured in Anthony Downs’ (1957: 103–113) discussion of how
they might rationally expect to attract votes. The first is by maintaining con-
sistency with past policy, thus creating long-term differences with other parties.
A consequence is that parties confront electors with clear choices between
contrasting programs. Electors can then vote for the party that appears most
suitable for them under prevailing circumstances. The availability of such
choices is a basic stipulation of mandate theory (Sullivan & O’Connor 1972;
Kavanagh 1981; Le Duc et al. 1996: 344, 352–353), itself a standard ‘vision’ of
how representative democracy works.
There is another, more direct way in which parties could translate popular
preferences into official policy. This is the one Downs (1957: 109–112) ulti-
mately puts forward in his account of two-party competition. Both parties con-
verge on the preferences of the median voter, thus leading to parties aligning
themselves directly with the wishes of the popular majority. This strategy, if
the parties get it right, certainly ensures the conformity of government policy
to majority preferences, since whichever party is elected will carry these
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through in order to maintain its credibility (Downs 1957: 108–110). What is
missing is electoral choice, as both parties will offer voters nearly identical
policy alternatives.
In government, as well as elections, parties can adopt divergent or conver-
gent strategies on the many problems that confront them. Even where public
opinion does not act as a clear guide, there are technical solutions approved
by experts and bureaucrats. Parties could adopt these as optimal and likely to
be generally approved, or they could opt for different ideologically colored
diagnoses of the problem situation (Castles 1982) thus opening up possibili-
ties for retrospective electoral choice on the basis of the government record.
Choice and responsiveness both seem desirable properties of democratic
party systems. However, one may get in the way of the other. The next section
considers the range of possible relationships between them. There is no a
priori basis on which we can identify a dominant mode. However, we can
specify the main possibilities in ways that permit later assessments with com-
parative evidence. The results have theoretical implications for democracy that
we consider in the conclusion.
Patterns of party response
We have suggested that party convergence on majority preferences or techni-
cal solutions can deprive voters of choice between distinct policy alternatives.
This need not always happen, however. Figures la and lb sketch two reactions
that parties might have. In the first case, Figure la, parties show themselves to
be responsive and to be offering a programmatic choice. In the second case,
Figure lb, parties show themselves to be responsive but to be offering no pro-
grammatic choice. The figure illustrates relationships between party stances
on an issue (vertical or Y axis) and problem impact and concern on the part
of the public (horizontal or X axis). In this hypothetical system there are three
parties – one on the Left (L), one in the Center (C) and one on the Right 
(R). Of course the presentation is made in three-party terms only as an
example. It would apply with equal force to a two-party system, and it would
generalize easily to a greater numbers of parties.
The three-party example sketched in Figure la shows that there is no nec-
essary conflict between responsiveness and choice. Here we have parties that
adjust their position on the problem in light of public concern about it and its
objective impact, but they also maintain stable policy differences based on ide-
ology. The Left party is always more preoccupied with the issue (which might
be government planning against unemployment). The Center is consistently
less, and the Right least so. However, as the underlying problem becomes more
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Figure 1a. Responsive parties: Two possible reactions to problems: Responsive parties 
offering a choice to electors.
Figure 1b. Responsive parties: Two possible reactions to problems: Responsive parties
which do not offer a choice to electors.
848
serious and public concern grows, all parties consistently rank the policy higher
among their priorities. They are both sensitive and responsive as democratic
parties are supposed to be, but they also maintain clear differences; whatever
increased attention parties as a whole give to the policy response the Left
always gives more. Thus an elector could well vote for L at level 3 of the
problem, but vote for R at level 9 if he or she felt that some, but not exces-
sive, government planning is desirable to confront the problem. This situation
provides optimal payoffs for democracy, since the two ‘goods’ get provided
without mutual inhibition. Parties both respond to problems and provide elec-
tors with an opportunity to influence the level of response.
Figure lb shows, however, that this need not always be the case. Here we
have parties that react in the same way to problems and concerns. Respon-
siveness is maintained at a high level as parties adjust their priorities. As all
parties respond in exactly the same way, however, there are no voting choices
to be made with respect to the issue. Voting for the Left will produce the same
effect on government as voting for the Right. This is the kind of reaction that
would be produced by convergence on the median in a quest for votes or by
accepting the same technical advice from bureaucrats. To the extent that gov-
ernments and oppositions are often urged to ‘sink their differences’ in face of
emergencies, ‘keep party politics out’ and adopt ‘commonsense solutions’ to
purely technical problems, we might expect this mode of reaction to be fairly
widespread.
On the other hand, parties are ideologically motivated entities that often
feel that they already know the optimal solutions to problems (Page & Shapiro
1983). This might lead them to ignore public concerns or technical advice in
favor of maintaining a consistent ideological stance. In that case, we have one
of the two situations shown in Figure 2. Hewing to the party line eliminates
responsiveness, but provides clear electoral choice. In Figure 2a, parties offer
consistent policy priorities that clearly differentiate them not just in the
present, but also historically. Electors clearly know what parties stand for not
just in terms of current policy, but also in the long term, covering possibly their
government record.
If parties shifted from one priority to another, as hypothesized in Figure
2b, electors would have choices on current policy in any one election, but
would hardly be able to deduce party positions from past record or know
where they would be three years on. Where they knew little of the issue, this
would deprive them of a valuable reference point for rational decision.
Because of frequent policy shifts, voters might well discount parties’ ability to
stick to the promised policy in government (Downs 1957: 104–110). This is a
situation in which parties’ sudden shifts – possibly due to vote-seeking or other
opportunistic considerations – undermine both responsiveness and choice.
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Figure 2a. Unresponsive parties: Two types of choice options to respond to problems:
Unresponsive parties offering reliable choice to electors.
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Figure 2b. Unresponsive parties: Two types of choice options to respond to problems:
Unresponsive parties offering unreliable choice to electors.
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A more optimistic and possibly more realistic scenario is sketched in Figure
3. There is, after all, no reason to believe that all parties act in the same 
paradigmatic way to rising public concern. This might take time to trigger a
response (C). Parties could also react differently, choosing to respond to a
problem (L) or to ignore a problem (R). These stances clearly differentiate
the parties, triggering some response in two cases and offering clear choices
between all three. Ideology interacts with public concern to produce a partic-
ular level of response, but also guarantees differentiation and choice as the
problem becomes more severe.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 span a range of possible relationships between party
responsiveness and policy choice. Which predominates (if indeed any does) or
whether they vary by policy area, party family or country are questions that
have important implications for how we think of party roles in democracy. At
an abstract level, we can specify the alternatives but not decide which prevails.
To do so we need evidence, examined below, before we return to the theoret-
ical question of how exactly democratic parties mediate between publics and
governments.
Choices parties offer
A first cut at deciding whether parties are responsive – and therefore move
around and overlap in terms of policy – or instead offer fixed and stable alter-
michael d. mcdonald, ian budge & paul pennings
© European Consortium for Political Research 2004
Left 
More 
 
 
 Policy 
Response                     Center
            
Less                    Right 
   Less                                                                                    More 
    Problem Impact/Concern 
Figure 3. Conditionally Responsive Parties.
851
natives to electors, comes from examining four central policy areas over the
postwar years. These policies are responses to the four issues nominated 
consistently by electors as the most important facing the country (employ-
ment, inflation, welfare and foreign affairs). They cover the policy areas
already identified as subject to political influence. Policy responses include
support for: (1) government planning, (2) a market economy, (3) welfare and
(4) peaceful international cooperation. We are interested in the extent to
which party policy positions here are generally distinguished from each other
or move around concurrently – possibly in response to electors’ concerns.
Party scores on these policies come from analyses of their postwar election
programs. Since these are directed towards voters, they are eminently suitable
for deciding whether parties differentiate themselves in elections or converge
on popular concerns. Actual scores and means are from Volkens (1994) and
are similar to those reported in Budge et al. (2001: Appendix 5), where the
construction of each indicator is described.1 Our data cover 71 parties in 16
democracies over 10 to 15 postwar elections up to 1992. The 1992 end date is
chosen since considerable changes took place in many party systems after that
date, with Italy as the most spectacular example, but Germany, the Nether-
lands, Belgium, New Zealand, Sweden, Norway and the United Kingdom also
being affected.
Given the enormous amount of information available on parties’ issue
positions over 16 countries, we measure their distinctiveness by comparing the
mean postwar policy positions of parties within a country and estimating 
the confidence intervals surrounding them. The comparative findings are best
approached, however, through the example of British party positions on the
market economy given in Figure 4. This shows quite a lot of policy movement
over the postwar period, which opens up the possibility that parties may be
responding to electoral concerns. Over the whole period, Labour support for
the market is consistently muted, while Conservatives are generally in strong
support. Liberals track the Conservatives in the early period and Labour in
the later one. The two main parties seem to offer reasonably distinct alterna-
tives, even though Liberal positions overlap them.
We can follow this illustration through to the corresponding entry for
British parties and market support in Table 1. British parties have offered two
clear and consistent policy alternatives. The entry is based on the fact that 
the Conservative postwar mean of 6.3 on the issue contrasts strongly with
Labour’s 1.2 – so strongly that the two are statistically significantly different
from one another. The Liberals at 3.5, on the other hand, overlap with the
Conservatives and hence are not counted as offering a really distinct alterna-
tive – justifiably in view of their track record in Figure 4. The attribution 
of distinct policy positions to Labour and Conservative fairly summarizes 
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their overall postwar record, though inevitably smoothing over episodes of
leapfrogging in 1955 and 1970.
Table 1 gives a summary record of the within-nation policy distinctiveness
for 71 parties from 1950 to 1992. An entry of 0 indicates that parties have been
offering no statistically significant distinctive choice on a policy issue; an entry
of 2 indicates that parties have been offering two policy options, and so on. In
the majority of countries, parties do offer generally distinct choices. Most often
this is the result of one or two parties standing distinct from a close-to-common
option of all the rest, where a ‘close-to-common’ option is determined by the
fact that the party positions are not statistically significantly different from one
another.2 Clusters of parties with similar policy preferences occur most often
in the multi-party systems. Despite their greater numbers of parties, therefore,
these party systems do not offer many more actual policy options on the indi-
vidual issues than, say, the two American parties, with their two generally dis-
tinctive positions. The issues where parties differentiate themselves most are
support for the market and support for welfare.
It is probably more important that parties adopt a generally distinctive
position than that they hold fast to their long-term positions at every single
election. Their general record is probably what gets through to electors given
constraints on communicating every particular twist of policy. What Table 1
michael d. mcdonald, ian budge & paul pennings
© European Consortium for Political Research 2004
Figure 4. British parties: Postwar support for a market economy.
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shows, therefore, is that parties do on the whole offer electors policy choices.
Whether they are responsive is less clear. As the British graph shows, the mean
policy positions average out a lot of over-time movement on issues. To see
whether policy movements respond to problems and public concern, however,
we need to relate the two directly.
Responsiveness to electoral concerns
Policy stands provide a basis for inference about party responses to electors,
but can hardly provide convincing evidence about the relationship. For this
we need to relate party policy directly to electoral concerns. Unfortunately,
comparable data on public opinion are hard to get over the full range of
postwar countries shown in Table 1. Even confining ourselves to the most
widely replicated Gallup question ‘What do you think is the most important
choice versus sensitivity: party reactions to public concerns
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Table 1. Distinct party policy options on four issues, 1945–1992
Planning Market Welfare Peace Total parties
United Kingdom 2 2 2 0 3
New Zealand 2 2 2 0 2–3
Australia 2 2 2 2 2–3
Canada 2 2 3 2 3–4
United States 2 2 2 2 2
Ireland 0 2 2 0 3
Germany 0 2 3 0 3
Austria 2 3 2 0 3
France 2 2 0 2 4
Switzerland 3 2 3 2 4
Netherlands 0 3 2 2 4–6
Belgium 2 2 2 0 3–6
Norway 2 2 3 2 5–7
Sweden 2 2 3 2 5
Denmark 0 2 2 2 6–8
Italy 0 2 0 2 7
Notes: Entries are the number of parties or clusters of parties whose mean score on the
issue does not overlap with others in terms of a 0.05 confidence interval. The last column is
the number of parties in the country whose programs were coded (all sizeable national
parties); this number may vary somewhat for different points in the postwar period.
854
problem facing the country?’ (or close variants of it), we can only cover some
time points for nine countries, get reasonably complete time series for four,
and really cover the whole postwar period for two: the United Kingdom and
the United States. Still, these data do provide a reasonably wide range of cases
over which to check relationships.
Relating party election policy on the four issues to public concern about
the area in the preceding year we can estimate a simple bivariate equation,
for each party, i, across elections through time, t:
Party emphases on planning are related to the annual average percentage of
electors nominating unemployment as the most important problem. Market
reliance is related to the percentage mentioning inflation. Welfare is related
to the percentage nominating social problems. And, peaceful cooperation is
related to the percentage nominating international relations and the danger
of war. The policy area matches are justified both in terms of a priori plausi-
bility and as giving the best correlations compared to other conceivable cor-
respondence between public concern and party policy.
Choosing the best-matching indicators of policy and concern turns out to
be a conservative assumption in light of our major finding from this analysis.
There are hardly any significant relationships to be found between electoral
concerns and party policy. Over the 60 individual equations that we were able
to examine for different parties and policy areas, only three were significant.
Varying our measures (e.g., taking public opinion in the year of the election
or in the relevant election month) produced no better results. The over-
whelming impression is that parties choose policy positions independently of
public sentiments at the time of the election.
This conclusion is reinforced by an independent study that went to the
length of re-coding the postwar American and British election platforms in
terms of the Gallup response categories to permit a more sensitive match
between them and public assessments of issue importance (Bara 1999). Again
no correlations were found in any of the issue areas examined here. From
Table 1 the parties seem to offer choices, and from the present analysis they
do not seem responsive.
Responding to problems
We can hardly stop here. Given the patchiness of some of the evidence, these
findings still need to be checked and extended. Particularly as we are dealing
with an absence of relationships with public opinion, the negative finding could
Party Policy  Concern eit it it= + +a b
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reflect data scarcity rather than an actual absence of substantive relationships.
Fortunately, there are other indicators to which we can turn. Our initial dis-
cussion pointed out that parties make decisions on a whole variety of prob-
lems, not just those that concern electors. On these, too, they can opt for a
commonly agreed solution, endorsed by experts and bureaucrats if not by the
public, or they can stick with their own ideologically colored solutions, giving
rise to continuing policy differences between their approaches.
Examining policy reactions to current issues both extends and supports the
analysis with public opinion. While some issues have a marginal impact on
electors, others – unemployment, inflation and international tensions – affect
them centrally. We can see this from Table 2, which shows correlations between
the actual seriousness of problems and public concern about them. Generally,
electors’ concern about unemployment and to a lesser extent inflation mirror
the actual situation (or at least the official statistics) quite closely. To this
extent, general indicators of unemployment and inflation are functioning as
choice versus sensitivity: party reactions to public concerns
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Table 2. Correlations between electoral perception of problem as most important and
problem indicator, by country, for varying postwar time periods
International
Country (N) (years) Unemployment Inflation Welfare peace
Sweden (7) (1987–1993) 0.940 0.319 0.947 ~~
Denmark (6) (1972–1982) 0.841 0.310 0.735 ~~
Netherlands (7) (1972–1990) 0.656 0.704 -0.824 ~~
France (9) (1960–1972) 0.762 0.279 0.127 ~~
Australia (13) (1980–1992) 0.534 0.446 -0.034 ~~
New Zealand (41) (1952–1992) 0.937 0.414 0.577 -0.314
United (41) (1952–1992) 0.953 0.725 -0.355 -0.796
Kingdom
Canada (14) (1968–1992) 0.805 0.907 -0.421 -0.257
United States (43) (1950–1992) 0.823 0.302 0.168 -0.739
Notes: Number of time points for each country and the period over which they are distributed are given
in parentheses. They are determined by the availability of comparable opinion data in each case (per-
centage nominating a problem as most important, or in Australia, New Zealand and Sweden, as among
the three most important). Use of year as an indicator of level of Cold War tensions means that time
periods when tensions did not markedly change are not appropriate for analysts and are not reported
(~~). Entries are bivariate correlations between the ‘objective’ problem indicator based on official sta-
tistics and the average annual percentage of respondents to Gallup and other surveys nominating the
problem as (among) the most important. ‘Objective’ indicators are percentage unemployed each year;
average percentage price increase each year; percentage of population aged more than 65; year of
postwar period. Because of the non-comparability over time periods, due to missing cases and single as
opposed to multiple nominations of important problems, the data cannot be pooled across countries.
The most reliable time series are those for the United Kingdom and the United States, followed by
Canada and New Zealand.
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surrogate measures of public concern. A weaker relationship exists for inter-
national tensions, where the level of concern is high during the Cold War era
but drops down with general rapprochement and the end of the Vietnam con-
flict at the beginning of the 1970s. This is particularly the case for the United
States and the United Kingdom, two nations that had been centrally involved
in the confrontation.
An alternative indicator, however, MIDS (i.e., involvement in militarized
inter-state disputes – not shown here) shows little relationship. This is also true
for the increase in the dependent elderly population, reflected only erratically
or not at all in electors’ mentions of welfare as a problem. In these policy areas,
it is still worth seeing whether parties respond to problems with agreed tech-
nical solutions or divergent diagnoses since their behavior here also affects the
choices offered in elections.
Some issues, it appears, are too detailed to concern electors consistently.
Overall, however, we can conclude that where electors show themselves con-
cerned, it is with good reason – when levels of unemployment or inflation are
high or when international tensions threaten to plunge the whole world into
war. This assessment rules out one possible explanation of the parties’
observed non-responsiveness: that the public ignores real problems con-
fronting governments in favor of passing issues that do not really demand a
serious response. On the contrary, electors seem to concern themselves with
central political problems (Marcus & Hanson 1993), naturally enough since
they bear the brunt of their effects.
Electoral realism about at least three of the problems we concentrate on
makes it appropriate to analyze relationships between party policies and
‘objective’ indicators along the same lines as for public opinion. The form of
the bivariate equation is, for any party, i, at election year, t:
As we have data for all countries and most elections in the postwar period,
we were able to examine 240 equations of this type, substituting MIDS for
year as an indicator of international tensions. MIDS, measured here as the per-
centage of world states involved each year in militarized interstate conflict, is
a more refined indicator of world turbulence that decision-makers are likely
to respond to and that in fact produces better correlations with party policy
than year. ‘Better’ in this context is relative, however, since the major results
from this analysis are negative. Only 15 (6 per cent) of equations showed a
statistically significant response by parties to developments in each policy area.
This is just about what is to be expected by chance over such a large number
of cases.
Party Policy  Objective Problem Indicator eit it it= + +a b
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Modeling tradeoffs between responsiveness and ideological choice
The evidence we have so far leads to a definite if negative conclusion: parties
do not respond much in policy terms either to public opinion or to current
problems. Our bivariate analyses constitute quite a thorough check on this
possibility as they go through the comparative evidence party by party,
making full allowance for individual party idiosyncrasies and unique country
characteristics. They are incomplete operationalizations of the tradeoffs illus-
trated in Figures 1, 2 and 3, however, which, among other things, raise possi-
bilities of interaction between ideology and responsiveness. They are also
incapable of answering the question: What else does drive party policy if not
pressures from the electorate or the sociopolitical developments parties have
to face up to?
One likely candidate is ideology in the sense of continuing differences
between Left and Right, particularly as intervention, planning and the free
market are classic areas of confrontation between these political tendencies.
The suggestion is that parties already think they can appeal to electors or solve
problems on the basis of previous stands on these issues, so there is little need
to adjust their policies when concern about them grows. Stable, ideologically
derived positions on individual issues then provide electors with a known
policy choice that they might not get from more responsive parties.
We can confront all the possibilities illustrated in Figures 1, 2 and 3 with a
single regression equation. This takes the form, for each party, i, at election
year, t:
where
Party Policy is the extent to which a party shows support for the relevant
policy in one of the four policy areas under investigation; Problem is the
corresponding indicator of the seriousness of the problem; and L-R rep-
resents the Left-Right leanings of the party as measured from the previ-
ous election program on the indicator construction reported in Budge et
al. (2001: Table 1.1).
The pattern of significant parameters emerging when the equation is applied
to our data shows which of the tradeoffs between responsiveness and differ-
entiated choice, illustrated in Figures 1, 2 and 3, actually occurs over our range
of postwar democracies. We can infer that a particular model applies when
one of five patterns emerges:
Party Policy  Problem L R Problem* L R eit it it it it= + + + ( ) +a b b b1 2 3- -
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1. Common party responsiveness with an ideologically based choice
(Figure 1a): b1 and b2 are nonzero while b3 is zero because this tells us
there is a common responsiveness (b1 non-zero) and a consistent dis-
tinction across parties based on ideology (b2 non-zero), but there is no
greater or lesser responsiveness according to party ideology (b3 = 0).
2. Common party responsiveness with no ideologically based choice
(Figure lb): the b1 coefficient is non-zero and b2 and b3 are zero because
this tells us that the parties respond to problems, but the Left parties are
no higher or lower than Centre or Right parties (b2 = 0), nor does Left
or Right responsiveness converge or diverge as the contextual pressure
builds up (b3 = 0).
3. Ideologically based choice, but no responsiveness (Figure 2a): the b2
coefficient is non-zero and b1 and b3 are zero. This tells us that ideology
matters, but there is no responsiveness (b1 = b3 = 0).
4. Ideologically contingent responsiveness (Figure 3): the b3 coefficient is
nonzero, while b1 and b2 may take on a zero or non-zero value.
5. Of course, there is the likelihood that, in certain settings, party 
behavior is so erratic as to be neither very responsive nor offer a 
good basis for choice (Figure 2b). In this case no parameter will be 
significant.
We can estimate the equation both in an aggregate analysis of the pooled data
over 16 democracies from 1950 to 1992, and for individual countries over that
period. There is a need to analyze the relationships at both levels, to check
whether the aggregate results really do apply in the individual case or whether
they are just averaging and obscuring dramatically different party responses
in the separate countries.
The results at both levels, however, are clear and consistent with each other.
Thus the aggregate findings can be quoted without fear of distorting the
overall picture. The main one is that party responses in each specific area are
more rooted in their ideology than in any other of the factors we have exam-
ined. We are not of course claiming that the equations include all of the factors
influencing policy responses. Given that the R2 ranges from 0.11 to 0.27, we
could hardly substantiate this. There are many other factors shaping policy that
we do not cover. Of those we do examine in the context of responsiveness
versus choice, however, ideology is obviously the one most related to policy.
Out of our series of hypothetical graphs, Figure 3 is the one fitted best by the
empirical findings. Generally the b2 coefficient for ideology in Equation 3 is
stronger and more reliably estimated than the others, as shown in the actual
equations with pooled data reported in Table 3. At this level, ideology, largely
on its own, is associated with a tenth to a quarter of the variation in the party
michael d. mcdonald, ian budge & paul pennings
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scores. Given all the other factors that can affect policy stands, this is sugges-
tive evidence of its influence.
The evidence on responsiveness is harder to interpret. In two policy areas,
peace and welfare, the severity of the problem makes a reliably distinguish-
able difference in the degree of support for a policy. In the economic policy
areas, government planning and market reliance, the interaction term shows
some degree of differential responsiveness to contextual circumstances
depending on the ideological tendency of the party. The best that can be said
of the evidence on responsiveness, however, is that it is very weak. It takes
data on 951 cases – individual parties in elections across 16 nations and 43
years – to uncover these effects, which do not emerge in either the single
country or single party analyses, including those with public concern substi-
tuted for the problem indicators. The general relationships across pooled data
by themselves are of little or no help in anticipating whether any one party in
any one nation is responsive.3
Coupling the low informational value of the aggregate evidence with the
evidence from individual parties, the really important message is that con-
veyed by the standing differences associated with ideology that do come
through in the country analyses. The picture of the parties that our evidence
draws is most like Figure 2a where the parties maintain the same policy posi-
tions regardless of contextual circumstances. There is one important caveat:
some parties in some countries are difficult to distinguish from each other
(Table 1) because of the unpredictable variability in the positions they take
from election to election. However, they are not responding either to prob-
lems or electoral concern; their policy stands vary in ways not covered by our
statistical models, which are focused rather than comprehensive.
Discussion: Party ideology and electoral choice
Whatever the theoretical possibilities may be, we conclude that, over the poli-
cies covered here, party policy positions on central issues come mainly out of
ideology among the influences examined. Via ideology, they are closely related
both to past policy and record (Downs 1957: 104–110) and, beyond that, to the
basic principles on which parties take their stand. Our comparative evidence
on this point is supported by earlier studies of particular countries and parties
(Stimson et al. 1995; Niemi & Weisberg 1984: Page & Shapiro 1983).
To some extent the picture that emerges is a flattering one. Parties are prin-
cipled and consistent, not opportunistic and vote grabbing. Every coin has its
reverse, however, and enthusiasts for party democracy might well react nega-
tively to the idea that parties are also inflexible and insensitive to public con-
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cerns. This can be explained if we allow for parties having to find their way in
a highly uncertain and confusing world. It is often unclear what the optimal
policy on current problems is, or how far the public is willing to trade off
progress in one policy area for progress in another. Lacking such information,
it is difficult to respond by adopting some appropriate policy. What is at issue
is what the majority actually does think and what is appropriate. What else do
parties have to guide them here but their principles (i.e., ideology)? This is
after all what principles/ideology are for. It is because of the difficulties of esti-
mating popular needs and appropriate responses in specific situations that
parties subscribe to an ideology in the first place. As its main function is to
provide answers to the central problems of the economy, society and interna-
tional affairs, it is small wonder that parties react in ideological terms when
these areas come under discussion. Parties cannot – any more than the rest of
us – react freshly to each new political development. They have to diagnose
them in terms of previous experiences and basic assumptions, which then to a
large extent define their reaction. As a result, parties maintain enduring policy
differences rooted in their divergent ideologies. There are positive benefits for
electors from this, which have been overlooked in the preoccupation with
Downs’ model of two-party competition and its prediction of convergence on
majority concerns. These are:
• Reasonably fixed policy positions advocated in successive elections and
pursued in government give parties a record and history that substan-
tially reduce information costs for voters. Even the least informed 
might have the feeling that a particular party stands for the interests of
‘people like me’, if it usually extends welfare or cuts taxes. These per-
ceptions then guide electors when they vote on other, often technical,
matters.
• Reasonably fixed policy positions also offer electors choices and stimu-
late debate over which choice is best. Automatic convergence on the
same policy by all parties would suppress debate. Free discussion plus
electoral choice are major defining characteristics of democracy. A
blanket consensus over policy would stifle both.
If they did consistently converge, parties would go against their own long-
term collective interest. They would rule themselves out as useful reference
points, in the policy environment anyway. Suppose parties were perfectly
responsive and converged automatically on a ‘technically appropriate’ or
‘majority-approved’ solution to problems. Would they not then become irrel-
evant to democratic politics in policy terms? No issue would need to be voted
on, as an optimal solution would already be found. Parties would all be 
choice versus sensitivity: party reactions to public concerns
© European Consortium for Political Research 2004
862
associated with the same policies (and if they were responsible, they would
have the same government record) so there would be nothing to distinguish
between them. Where voting was required, it might as well be on the direct
alternatives for resolving the issue. Party endorsements would add nothing to
electors’ information about what the choice entailed.
Seen in this light, party privileging of differentiation and choice over sen-
sitivity and responsiveness seems neither irrational not suspect. If we are not
to rule out disagreement – an essence of politics – altogether, it is surely better
that divergences are anchored in stable reference points associated with a
record and a known history rather than shifting alliances of unknown prove-
nance and perhaps dubious interests. In this broader sense, parties help to
provide translation of majority preferences into public policy. They give voters
the opportunity to choose between reasonably clear alternatives, which the
electoral winner then has a chance to effect in government – just as govern-
ment mandate theory says they should.
There is, of course, a difficulty with the mandate in multi-party coalition
systems where governments are not necessarily determined by the election.
Even in this case, however, voting for a party with clearly defined policies gives
it more weight in coalition negotiations and governments, as Barry (1970: 123)
stressed. There are other ways in which public opinion influences policy under
‘consensus democracy’ (Lijphart 1999), but voting for parties that promote
policies closest to one’s own is surely one of them.
Summary and overview
If choice is a good thing, parties do well to maximize it, even at a certain cost
in sensitivity and responsiveness. Our reflections on the possibilities allowed
for a range of possible tradeoffs, reflecting ambiguities in democratic theory
about the exact relationship between responsiveness and choice. The com-
parative evidence paints a picture of ideological parties offering choices to
electors without much adaptation to changing circumstances. The mainspring
of policy flexibility over time comes from electorates switching votes between
parties and alternatives, rather than parties adapting to electors’ wishes. That
puts a burden on electors; they have to know generally where parties stand on
issues. However, that burden is modest inasmuch as knowing the general ide-
ological inclination of parties is among the most important pieces of informa-
tion to have in order to make an informed choice. This is not the only way
popular preferences could get translated into government policy, but it is a
perfectly feasible and democratic one.
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Data Appendix
It was desirable to check out the theoretically possible trade-offs against as
wide a range of countries, parties and time-periods as possible to avoid
drawing idiosyncratic conclusions from a limited set of cases. This concern
dominated collection strategies.
Public Opinion
The only issue question that appears in a majority of polls and surveys is:What
do you think is the most important problem facing the country? (Sometimes
‘the three most important problems’). The Gallup code of responses is fairly
standardized. ‘Unemployment’ appears as a separate category in most coun-
tries. We grouped answers referring to financial situation, interest rates,
budget, inflation, prices, wages and standard/cost of living under ‘inflation’.
‘International peace’ grouped references to military, alliances, defense, foreign
affairs/relationships, peace and aid. ‘Welfare’ grouped health, housing, pen-
sions, social policy, poverty, welfare, social justice and equality.
Data were obtained from: the Gallup Poll (Gallup 1972, 1978, 1979–1988);
the Gallup International Opinion Polls for Great Britain (1937–1975) and
France (1939, 1944–1975 (Gallup 1976); and the Gallup Political and Economic
Index (1966–1995). In addition, various bodies and individuals furnished infor-
mation from surveys incorporating the important problems’ question: New
Zealand: Department of Public Policy, University of Waikato; Australia:
Professor Ian McAllister, Australian National University; Sweden: CEIFOS,
Goteborg; Denmark and the Netherlands: Steinmetzarchief Amsterdam;
Canada: Carleton University Social Science Data Archives, Ottawa.
Party Policy
Data are taken from the 1994 release of the Comparative Manifest Project
(Volkens 1994). The estimates are produced by coding the sentences of party
election programs into 57 policy categories, then percentagizing and combin-
ing category percentages to score summaries as follows:
Planning: controlled economy, economic planning, market regulation
Market: free enterprise, economic orthodoxy
Welfare: pro-welfare state, social justice
International Peace: peace, anti-military, anti-special foreign relations
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Figure 5. United Kingdom: Average annual percentage of Gallup respondents seeing
problem as most important with indicator of the seriousness of problem, 1952–1993.
Percentages are calculated on the basis of all (quasi)-sentences in a manifesto.
Ideology
The measure of Left-Right ideology is taken from the same source. The
measure is constructed by summing percentage mentions of 13 Right issues
and subtracting this from the summed percentage mentions of 13 Left issues
865choice versus sensitivity: party reactions to public concerns
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Figure 5. (Continued).
(see also Klingemann et al. 1994: 40). The scores could range from +100 (party
totally on Left) to -100 (party totally on Right). The actual range is normally
from +60 to -60. Some of the items in the ideology measure overlap with those
used to construct policy indices. Hence ideology score in the previous election
is related to current policy to avoid tautology, even though we are checking
their tendency to go together rather than causality.
Problem Indicators
Sources are: Cross-national Political and Economic Statistics (OECD, various
dates), United Nations Demographic Yearbook (United Nations, various
866
dates), Stuart Bremer kindly supplied us with the MIDS indicator. The indi-
cators taken directly from these sources are as follows:
Unemployment: annual average percentage of workforce unemployed
Welfare: annual percentage of population aged 65 and over
Inflation: percentage annual change in the consumer price index
MIDS: number of militarized interstate disputes involving each country
in a year (for individual country analyses) and number of countries
involved in militarized interstate disputes each year (for aggregate
comparisons).
Notes
1. It may be that a party will sometimes signal its commitment to one side of an issue by
making a short dramatic statement about it rather than giving it a substantial amount of
attention. It is becoming clear, however, that the debate over party issue position taking
and party issue salience (see, e.g., Laver 2001; Budge 2000, 2001) is not the meaningful
distinction it may have once seemed. The evidence and, therefore the emerging consen-
sus, is that using issue salience is a valid and reliable means of indicating party position
taking (Gabel & Huber 2000; McDonald & Mendes 2001; Laver n.d.).
2. The overlapping versus distinct party mean positions have been evaluated by regressing
party scores, within country, onto a set of dummy variables representing the country’s
parties. Each party was successively treated as the excluded category so that the test of
statistical significance recorded which other parties were statistically distinct from the
baseline party, assuming homoscedastic party variances. A single cluster is defined as one
in which, for example, party A is not different from party B and party B is not different
from party C, whether or not party A and party C differ from each other. By this method,
the amount of choice shown in Table 1 is a conservative estimate.
3. Because we are not able to conduct a full-scope causal analysis, we do not want to go so
far as to conclude that objectively identified problems play no role in the policy positions
stances taken by parties. Nevertheless, given that our evidence shows the relationship is
somewhere between weak and nonexistent, that taking account of ideology does little to
sort out an identifiable direct or conditional linkage with problems, and that the publics
identify problems in line with objective indications, leads us to conclude that party
responses to problems are not a persistent or in any sense major source of party policy
position taking.
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